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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS 2D HOWITZER BATTALION, 35TH ARTILLERY

AFPO San Francisco 96376

AVGAY-C

SUBJECT:

Operational Concept for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 67.

THRU:

Commanding Officer
54th Artillery Group
ATTN: AVGA-C
APO San Francisco 96376

Commanding General
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery
ATTN: AVFB-FAC
APO San Francisco 96266

Commanding General
United States Army Vietnam
ATTN: AVHOC-DH
APO San Francisco 96375

Commander-In-Chief
United States Army Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT
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TO:

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
ACSFOR, DA
Washington, D. C. 20310

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SECTION I

Significant Headquarters or Unit Activities

1. (C) Administration and Personnel

a. The 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery remained assigned to the 54th Artillery Group. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, Battery B, and Battery C maintained a consolidated permanent base camp at XUAN LOC, YT 473097. Battery A maintained a permanent base camp at NUI DAT, YS 428665. Service Battery maintained a permanent base camp at LONG BINH, XT 056116.

b. Command changes:

(1) LTC William H Ritter, who had commanded the battalion since 5 January 1967, departed on 21 June 1967. Major Donald S Brown, the battalion executive officer, commanded from 21 June 1967 until the arrival of LTC Alvin J Gendron, who assumed command on 9 July 1967.

(2) Captain Carl L Freeman took command of Battery A from Captain Andrew T McGarry on 15 May 1967.

(3) Captain Winton Sniller Jr took command of Battery B from Captain Harold K Nelson on 18 July 1967.

c. The battalion prepared for and successfully passed its Annual General Inspection, administered by USARV during the period 10-14 July 1967.

d. Normal S-1 activities were conducted during the period 1 May 1967 through 31 July 1967.

e. Personnel strength of the command on 31 July 1967 was:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOE AUTH</u> <u>OFF WO IN</u>	<u>GO AUTH*</u> <u>OFF WO IN</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u> <u>OFF WO IN</u>
Headquarters Battery	15 0 112	15 1 129	13 1 145
Battery A	3 0 117	5 0 121	4 0 136
Battery B	3 0 117	5 0 121	4 0 126
Battery C	3 0 117	5 0 121	5 0 136
Service Battery	3 3 82	3 3 82	2 4 107
TOTALS	27 3 545	33 4 574	28 5 650

* General Order Number 80, Hq, 5th US Army dated 20 April 1966 authorized the strengths shown. The pending ITOL for this unit reflects these figures.

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f. There is a critical shortage of lieutenants in the battalion, as follows:

Authorized - 18

Short - 4

Evacuated
to Japan - 1

Special Leave
(eff 10 July)-1

For Duty - 12

Only one lieutenant is scheduled for assignment to the battalion in September.

g. Although the enlisted strength exceeds that authorized, the following critical NCO shortages exist:

MOS	TITLE	GRADE	AUTHORIZED	SHORT
13B40	Gunner	E5	24	13
13E20	FDC Computer	E5	7	7
36K40	Wire Section Chief	E6	4	3
36K40	Wire Team Chief	E5	10	8
94B20	First Cook	E5	10	4

h. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>
GAINS (New In Country)	10	4	283
LOSSES (DIROS)	12	3	331
INFUSION*within 54th Arty Gp	7	0	98
INFUSION*outside 54th Arty Gp	0	0	0

*The direct exchange of personnel of like grade and MOS between units to reduce rotational humps of DIROS and to improve continuity in both units. As a result of the above infusions, this battalion's DIROS are distributed as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PERCENT ROTATING</u>	<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PERCENT ROTATING</u>
JUL	03%	JAN	03%
AUG	03%	FEB	03%
SEP	08%	MAR	21%
OCT	03%	APR	22%
NOV	03%	MAY	17%
DEC	06%	JUN	02%

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1. Casualties included

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<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Killed In Action	1
Wounded In Action	1
Missing In Action	0
Nonbattle dead	0
Nonbattle Missing	1
Nonbattle Casualties	15

j. Awards and decorations presented to members of this command included:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
Legion of Merit	1
Bronze Star (Valor)	1
Bronze Star (Achievement)	11
Bronze Star (Merit)	30
Air Medal (Merit)	10
Air Medal (Oak Leaf Cluster)	1
Commendation Medal (Valor)	0
Commendation Medal (Achievement)	0
Commendation Medal (Merit)	14
Purple Heart	3

NOTE: In addition to these awards, 57 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USARV.

k. R&R Program schedules include the following:

(1) The in-country R&R consisting of 3 day passes to Vung Tau have been utilized by 12 personnel.

(2) The out-of-country R&R included the following 5 day quotas:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	9	8	6	23
Tokyo	8	2	6	16
Manila	3	0	1	4
Hong Kong	4	6	6	16
Taipei	12	5	8	25
Singapore	0	2	0	2
Kuala Lumpur	0	0		

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(2) Out-of-country Reports

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Penang	1	0	0	1
Hawaii	5	12	6	23

1. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest APO. Numbers for the units are as follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>APO</u>
HQ Battery	96376
Battery A	96291
Battery B	96376
Battery C	96376
Service Battery	96266

m. Judicial and nonjudicial actions by units include:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>ARTICLE 15</u>	<u>SUMMARY COUNTS</u>	<u>SPECIAL COUNTS</u>	<u>GENERAL COUNTS</u>
HQ Battery	12	0	0	0
Battery A	4	0	0	0
Battery B	3	0	0	0
Battery C	2	0	0	0
Service Battery	3	0	0	0
TOTALS	24	0	0	0

n. Pertinent medical service statistics include:

Total patient visits (unit personnel)	677
Admitted to hospital	46
Evacuated within country	46
Malaria cases	0

o. Reportable accidents included:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>VEHICLES</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL</u>
HQ Battery	1	0	1
Battery A	1	0	6
Battery B	1	0	0
Battery C	1	0	1
Service Battery	2	0	0

p. The morale of the command is outstanding. In addition to previously reported facilities, the battalion theater has been covered to protect the audience from the elements. One special service show was provided for the battalion during the quarter.

q. Educational material, advertising, available USAFI, and correspondence courses were distributed among the batteries during the quarter.

r. Religious services, both Protestant and Catholic are held weekly. Work has begun on refurbishing the interior of the battalion chapel at Xuan Loc.

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8. Throughout the battalion, personal hygiene, prophylaxis usage and frequent lectures on venereal diseases have helped in lowering the VD rate. The battery commanders, surgeon, and chaplain, compliment each others efforts to find a solution to the problem.

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2. (C) Intelligence

a. The battalion continues its mission to provide aerial observers for the visual reconnaissance program of the XUAN LOO area. The area of responsibility is generally limited by the range of the 175mm guns. The average number of missions and hours flown per day are three missions and six hours respectively. Since the 30th of July the battalion has had two O-1 aircraft assigned for visual reconnaissance. This greatly improves the ability of the battalion to cover its area of responsibility.

b. The camp perimeter was harassed on three occasions by Viet Cong grenades, one claymore mine and intermittent small arms and automatic weapons fire. No US casualties were sustained. Results of responding friendly fires are unknown. The incidents occurred on moonless and rainy nights.

c. The annual AGI was conducted on 10 July 1967. No discrepancies were found. The overall rating of the S2 section was outstanding.

(A)

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a. The scheduling of mandatory subjects for the batteries is accomplished by battalion operations due to the frequent operational commitments of the batteries. While on operations, suitable subjects are integrated into the normal performance of duties. To maintain, improve and expand request' job skills within the battalion, on the job training and cross training is given continuous emphasis.

b. The following periods of instruction were presented during the reporting period:

- (1) Command Information
- (2) Character Guidance
- (3) Prevention of Heat Injuries
- (4) Control of Bleeding
- (5) Driving Safety
- (6) Physical Security
- (7) Safe Handling of Firearms and Explosives
- (8) Riot Control
- (9) Gas Chamber Refresher
- (10) Introduction to CBR Warfare
- (11) VJ Control
- (12) Replacement Training
- (13) Commander's Initial Orientation
- (14) Geneva Convention
- (15) Weapons Familiarization
- (16) Guard Duty
- (17) Survival, Evasion and Escape
- (18) Mission of US Army in Vietnam
- (19) Code of Conduct
- (20) Armed Forces Censorship
- (21) Clandestine Surveillance and Listening Devices
- (22) Defense Against Subversion and Espionage
- (23) Safeguarding defense information
- (24) Civil Affairs

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- (25) Replacement Training
- (26) Special Weapons Training
- (27) FADAC Indoctrination
- (28) Projectionist Training

c. During the Annual General Inspection conducted 10 July 1967 battalion training management received an outstanding rating.

d. A Fort Sill Training Team for the M109 howitzer consisting of a team chief, an automotive expert and a main armament expert visited all firing batteries during May, June and July and presented instruction dealing with proper maintenance and firing procedures.

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4. (C) Operations

a. At the beginning of the reporting period the battalion was deployed and executed missions as follows:

(1) Headquarters and Headquarters Battery was located at XUAN LOC, grid YT 473097 and provided normal support to the battalion and was responsible for base camp defense.

(2) Service Battery was located at LONG BINH, grid YT 056116.

(3) Battery A was located at NUI DAT, grid YS 428665, in general support of IIFORCEV reinforcing the 1st Bn, 83d Arty.

(4) Battery B was located at grid XT 457268 in general support of IIFORCEV, reinforcing the 25th Inf Div Arty during Operation MANHATTAN.

(5) Battery C was located at GIA RAY, grid YT 628113 in general support of IIFORCEV, reinforcing the 9th Inf Div Arty, in support of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cav, which conducted a search and destroy mission in that area.

b. Battery A departed NUI DAT 2 May 1967 for a field position at Grid YS 4962 with the mission of GS IIFORCEV, reinforcing the 1st Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. The assignment terminated 8 May 1967 and the battery returned to its base camp.

c. Battery C returned to the XUAN LOC base camp 2 May 1967; then moved to Fire Support/Patrol Base (FS/PB) GIA RAY, grid YT 628113 on 5 May 1967. A command and control element from this battalion accompanied the battery and assumed control of C-2-35, B-1-83 and C-1-83 Arty. The latter two batteries were attached to this battalion the same day. The mission assigned was GS IIFORCEV, reinforcing the 18th ARVN Div Arty and the 3d Squadron, 5th Cav, 9th Inf Div during Operation ~~MANHATTAN~~.

C. The following day, B-2-35 Arty, which had been released from its mission in support of Operation MANHATTAN, moved into Battery C's location, grid YT 628113. Battery C displaced to FS/PB, grid YT 742999 and was attached to the 173d ABN Bde, reinforcing the 3-319th Arty. At 061800H, July 1967, command and control of the fire support elements of grid YT 628113 changed to the 1st Bn, 83d Arty. B-1-83 and C-1-83 reverted to their parent battalion while B-2-35 was attached to the 1-83 Arty. The command and control element from this battalion returned to the XUAN LOC base camp the morning of 7 May 1967.

d. On 10 May 1967, Battery B displaced to FS/PB at grid YT 740000. Battery C changed its attachment from the 173d ABN Bde to the 1-83 Arty, which was assigned the mission of GS 173d ABN Bde reinforcing the fires of the 3d Bn, 319th Arty during Operation DAYTON. The operation terminated 17 May 1967 and the batteries deployed as follows:

(1) Battery B returned to the XUAN LOC base camp and assumed the mission of GS IIFORCEV.

(2) Battery C moved to Dien Hoa air base, grid YT 028150 and assumed the mission of GS IIFORCEV, reinforcing the 3-319th Arty during Operation CINCINNATI. The mission terminated 24 May 1967.

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e. On 24 May 1967, Battery C was given the mission of GS IIFORCEV reinforcing the 11th Cav Battery in support of the LONG BINH-BINH HOA security forces. On 27 May, the battery received the additional mission of GS IIFORCEV reinforcing the 2-33d Arty, 1st Inf Div in support of a search and destroy operation to the north of BINH HOA.

f. Battery A was attached on 17 June 1967 to the 9th Inf Div and was moved by barge to a PS/PB, grid XS 895616 in the Mekong Delta on 18 June 1967. The battery was further attached to the 3-34th Arty with the mission of reinforcing that unit during Operation CONCORDIA. On 2 July 1967 Battery A moved three howitzers and a supplemental FDC to grid XS 829679. The battery consolidated at grid XS 895616 on 10 July 1967. At the end of the reporting period Battery A continued its current mission.

g. Battery B departed the XUAN LOC base camp 29 June 1967 on a three day operation. During this period the battery was attached to the 9th Inf Div reinforcing the 1-11th Arty. This Operation, QUICKSILVER, was a combined operation between the 9th Inf Div and the 18th ARVN Div.

h. On 7 July 1967, the battalion(-) was committed to a combined US-ARVN-Australian operation. The command and control element departed XUAN LOC 7 July 1967 and joined Battery C at LONG BINH where Battery C was relieved of its mission in the BINH HOA-LONG BINH area. The following day all battalion involved elements were attached to the 9th Inf Div and were deployed as follows:

(1) The command and control element and Battery C moved to the vicinity of grid XS 495625 and assumed control of B-1-84th Arty, 9th Inf Div. With the arrival at that location, the fire support elements went under the operational control of the 1st Australian Task Force and assumed the mission of reinforcing the 4th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery. On 9 July 1967, a move to PS/PB in the vicinity of grid YS 653693 was completed, where the US elements remained in support of Operation PADDINGTON, until 15 July 1967. The operation terminated 15 July 1967 and Battery C and the command and control element returned to the XUAN LOC base camp where Battery C assumed the mission of GS IIFORCEV.

(2) Battery B departed XUAN LOC and joined the 3-5th Cav, 9th Inf Div on 8 July 1967. The battery was attached to the 1-11th Arty and received the mission of reinforcing that unit from a PS/PB in the vicinity of grid YS597760. On 11 July 1967 the mission was changed to Direct Support of the ARVN contingent and the battery occupied a new PS/PB, grid YS633772. After two additional displacements the unit returned to the XUAN LOC base camp on 17 July 1967 and assumed a mission of GS IIFORCEV.

(3) LTC Gardner, CO, 4th Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery and COL Meyers, 9th Div Arty commander personally complimented the battalion on its outstanding performance during this operation. B and C Batteries received letters of appreciation from the 9th Div Arty.

1. Weapons in all firing batteries were calibrated for charges 5 green bag, and 5, 6 and 7 white bag during May 1967.

j. The following number of missions were fired during the quarter with the total amounts of ammunition expenditure:

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UNIT

NUMBER OF DISCHARGES PER D

AMMUNITION EXPENDED

Battery A	1930	18549
Battery B	3195	15656
Battery C	3584	26059
TOTALS	8709	60264

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5. (C) Logistics

a. Eight more troop billets were constructed. These were completed using troop labor. These screened buildings aid in the health, morale and welfare of personnel.

b. During the reporting period, resupply in all areas has steadily improved. Logistical items which have impaired unit effectiveness are as follows:

<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REL. NUMBER</u>
Carrier Assembly	1025-757-4787	7141	602
Valve Assembly	1025-919-3441	7134	603
Evacuator Assembly	1025-856-9876	7150	607
Shaft Follower Assembly	1025-856-9875	7031	664
Follower Block Assembly	1025-856-9875	7155	601
Torque Key	1025-801-6751	7150	600
Key, Evacuator	1025-856-9876	7136	613
Ring, Locking	1025-821-2462	7136	614
Extractor	1025-860-9176	7119	604
Detent Plunger	1025-919-1408	7155	602
Semiconductor Device	5960-856-1316	7177	600
Rectifier Fan	2590-900-8311	7136	615
Breech Block Assembly	1025-967-7537	7136	600
Pin Spring	5315-898-9824	7153	607
Knob in Firing Mechanism Assy	1025-856-9874	7103	600
Radiator, 3/4 ton	2930-737-3692	7103	601
Engine, 5 ton	Third Echelon		
Wheel Bearings, 1 ton	2530-887-1341	7162	403
Prop Shaft Repair Kits, 1 ton	2520-678-3072	7173	410
Transmission, 1 ton	2520-887-1354	7182	
Tires, 3/4 ton	2610-051-9266	7156	407
Tire Rims, 1 ton	10921860	7134	400

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5. (Cont)

<u>NOTIFICATION</u>	<u>FSN</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>REL. NUMBER</u>
Spark Plugs, All Types	2920-752-4258	7137	DX
	2920-835-7724	7137	DX
Head and Tail Lights	6240-044-6914		
	6240-686-4168		
	6240-019-0877		
Valve Cover Gaskets	2805-678-1821	7133	402
Fan Belts, 1 ton	3030-684-1486	7132	403

c. The requirement for serial resupply was placed on this unit during Operation QUICKSILVER. This was the first time this unit gained any experience factors to assist in future serial resupply problems.

d. During Operation PADDINGTON, Service Battery elements were located in XUAN LOC, LONG BINH, NUI DAT, VUNG TAU, and LONG GIAO (BLACKHORSE). This provided flexibility to assist in all supply areas.

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6. (U) Civic Actions

a. During the period 1 May 1967 to 31 July 1967, the battalion Civic Actions MEDCAP Team concentrated its activities in the assigned sector in LONG KHANH Province, with particular emphasis on the village of TAN LAP, which consist of five (5) hamlets. Local GVN, RF/PF and civilian leaders worked closely with the team to coordinate activities. All projects are of a joint effort, with US personnel providing material and technical assistance as required.

b. The MEDCAP Team, headed by the Battalion Surgeon, treated 500 patients through visits to TAN LAP. Approximately 15 of these patients were admitted to the province hospital at XUAN LOC or required follow up action of some nature. In addition, approximately 300 Vietnamese civilians were treated by battery medics on field operations during this period. The method of treating patients during MEDCAP was improved during this quarter. Patients were previously treated in an open air village market place. Treatment of patients was very difficult because of noise and villagers crowding around the doctors. Patients are now treated in an orderly, efficient manner in the village chief's office, which offers some degree of privacy and helps expedite the treatment of patients. This method has also added to the prestige of the village chief.

c. The village of TAN LAP received assistance in the form of fortification material, soap and food items. Assistance was also given in material and technical aid to improve the sanitation and defense of TAN LAP. This was accomplished through water well improvements, training of the village medic, and work on protective fences and bunkers.

d. The Civic Action Team assisted the XUAN LOC orphanage through the contribution of food items and soap.

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7. (U) Communications

a. From 1 May 1967 to 30 July 1967 the communications section handled approximately thirty (30) radio messages. The message center handled 261 messages in addition to all incoming and outgoing distribution for the battalion.

b. FM radio communications between battalion headquarters and separated batteries was made possible by placing a radio retransmission station (AN/VRC-49) at grid YT 605102 on top of CHUA CHAN Mountain. Units were located 50 to 150 miles away from the battalion headquarters. It was also necessary to install an RT 524 radio inside of a building for continuous FM radio communications between Service Battery and battalion headquarters. This was made possible by wiring two 12 volt batteries in series to obtain 24 volts to operate the radio and by making a battery charger that operates from 110 AC to keep the batteries charged.

c. Supply of communication replacement parts continues to be extremely limited.

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SECTION II

PART I-OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Personnel and Administration: None
2. (C) Intelligence

ITEM: Fields of Fire for Base Camps

DISCUSSION: The enemy was able to approach the perimeter within claymore and grenade range due to the close proximity of the village which surrounds the camp on three sides. On the fourth side, visibility to the flanks was at that time, limited seriously by a banana plantation and scrub growth.

OBSERVATION: That adequate fields of fire for perimeter defense were not provided for in the initial layout of the base camp.

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3. (C) Training and Organization

ITEM: Rotation of Personnel

(1) DISCUSSION: Since the battalion entered the country as a unit and only a negligible amount of infusion occurred in the preceding year, the majority of the assigned personnel rotated to CONUS during May 1967. This left many of the sections with only skeleton crews of trained personnel who were familiar with the required mode of operation under conditions imposed by the counterinsurgency war waged in Vietnam. Since the majority of the combat support elements were committed to operation DARTON, during this period, the operational readiness of the battalion entered a critical stage. Realizing this situation, officers and NCO's alike initiated an aggressive and effective on-the-job training program which is being continued at the present time and extended through cross training.

(2) OBSERVATION: Timely and adequate infusion of personnel is necessary to prevent creation of undue stress on the combat readiness and effectiveness of a committed unit.

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4. (C) Operations

a. ITEM: Lack of Organic Aircraft

DISCUSSION: The lack of organic helicopter aircraft for a non-divisional, general support artillery battalion was severely felt during the last quarter. This unit had batteries committed throughout the III CTZ and IV CTZ. In order to furnish the required operational, administrative, logistical, maintenance and general welfare support to the dispersed elements, detailed coordination and frequent personal visits by the commander and his staff are mandatory. In many cases, air travel is the only feasible means of communication because of non-existent or insecure roads or otherwise prohibitive time loss. Since reaction time is critical during the planning as well as the execution phase of every operation, dependence on occasionally available aircraft is overly restrictive and detrimental to the coordinated and effective execution of assigned missions. During Operation CORONADO, Battery A was operating in the Mekong Delta, at one time over 200 km from battalion headquarters. Without organic aircraft, and amplified by the fact that the supported divisional unit did not provide the requested transportation at times, the battalion was unable to bring in the required items of maintenance parts, mail and replacements.

OBSERVATION: Non-divisional battalions with a mission similar to this unit require an augmentation of organic or allocated helicopter aircraft.

b. ITEM: Planning of Operations

DISCUSSION: Planning headquarters for an operation allow only a minimum amount of reaction time to subordinate participating units. This may be tolerable to organic elements which are co-located, but has proven to be highly haphazard due to the distances involved.

OBSERVATION: Dissemination of information by task force headquarters to attached or reinforced units was not issued on a timely basis.

c. ITEM: Assignment of Status and Missions

DISCUSSION: It has been this battalion's experience during the past quarter that divisional units prefer to have supporting artillery assigned in an attached status. This gave the supported unit wide operational latitude over the attached battery. On the other hand it was found that the logistical and maintenance responsibilities associated with an attached status were not considered or accepted to the full extent. During Operation CORONADO, the supported divisional unit did not provide the necessary maintenance support, nor make air transportation available to correct supply and maintenance problems. Due to the minimum reaction time applied by headquarters prior to an operation, only a minimum of coordination between the supported and supporting element could be accomplished. In addition, attachment to organic divisional units was late, not clearly spelled out, or merely assumed to be in force by the supported unit.

OBSERVATION: Supporting artillery units were placed in an attached status. The associated responsibilities were not specified.

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d. ITEM: Cross Country Mobility

DISCUSSION: During Operation PADDINGTON, Battery B was committed in support of the 3-5th Cav, 9th Inf Div and a Vietnamese Task Force. Due to the inaccessability of the objectives, and PS/PB by wheeled vehicles, the battery had to be deployed without its ammunition vehicles and other wheeled trucks. This placed the battery into the rather questionable situation to move into battle without organic maintenance, mess, supply and communications support and made it dependent upon immediate ammunition resupply as the weapons moved with only 28 rounds per tube. This greatly limited the flexibility and combat power normally available. The non-availability of barrier material made the unit highly vulnerable to mortar attacks.

OBSERVATION: Due to the limited and often weather dependant road net, self-propelled M109 howitzer batteries were overly restricted by wheeled vehicles. Therefore, the cross country mobility of batteries was not fully realized.

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5. (C) Logistics

ITEM: Supply Base

a. DISCUSSION: On Operation PADDINGTON with the 9th Inf Div, Headquarters, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment at LONG GIAO (BLACKHORSE) became a supply base for operations for further air movement of supplies. Many tons of supplies were moved by truck over 55 km of road. This road had to be cleared every day. At the completion of the operation, many supplies had to be brought back to LONG BINH.

b. OBSERVATION: All classes of supply were readily available in VUNG TAU and only 15 minutes by air from either of the Fire Support/Patrol Bases. Since it was known that one FS/PB had to be supplied by air, it would have taken a minimum of coordination to use VUNG TAU as the supply center instead of LONG GIAO (BLACKHORSE).

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6. (U) Civic Actions: None

7. (C) Communications:

a. ITEM: AM Radio Transmitter Failures.

DISCUSSION: Radio set, AN/GRC-46 has been used in the continuous wave (CW) mode to a great extent. Experience has shown that the T-195 transmitter does not last under this prolonged use. Downtime rate for this transmitter and repair time have been excessive. Attempts to cool the transmitter by improvised fans and overhead shielding from heat have been unsuccessful.

OBSERVATION: Radio Set AN/VRC-46 is not sufficiently durable for sustained operation in a tropical climate.

b. ITEM: Need for 110 AC to 24 DC converter for FM radio RT 524

DISCUSSION: Frequently there is a need to install FM radios RT 524 inside buildings or tents and to monitor radio nets on a twenty-four hour basis over extended periods of time. It is impractical to use a vehicular mounted radio (AN/VRC-46) under this condition, because the use of the vehicle for transportation is lost, and there is excessive wear on the vehicle battery and engine.

OBSERVATION: Normally there is a 110 AC power available at locations where FM radios are required to be installed inside of a building. By using a 110 AC to 24 DC converter, the 110 AC power may be used to operate the radios, or a battery charger and two twelve volt batteries wired in series may be used to operate the radios from 110 AC power.

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SECTION II PART II-RECOMMENDATIONS (C)

1. (U) Personnel and Administration: None
2. (U) Intelligence: Recommend that adequate fields of fire for perimeter defense be planned in the initial layout of base camps.
3. (C) Training and Organization: Recommend that timely and adequate infusion of personnel be mandatory to prevent creation of undue stress on the combat readiness and effectiveness of a committed unit.
4. (C) Operations:
 - a. Recommend that non-divisional battalions be augmented with organic or attached aircraft (helicopter).
 - b. Recommend that dissemination of information by task force headquarters to attached or reinforced units be issued on a timely basis.
 - c. Recommend that if artillery units are placed in an attached status, they be given specific instructions as to the inherent responsibilities of artillery missions by the attaching unit.
 - d. Recommend that self-propelled artillery battalions be equipped with the 6-ton full tracked cargo truck M548. Mess, maintenance, and supply will have to be provided by other means.
5. (C) Logistics: Recommend that FS/PB's receive area support from the nearest supply center.
6. (U) Civic Action: None
7. (C) Communications:
 - a. Recommend that radio set AN/GRC-46 be replaced with RTT Set AN/GRC-142.
 - b. Recommend that a 110 AC to 24 DC converter and a battery charger to charge 24 volt batteries from a 110 AC power source be made components of FM radio RT 524.



ALVIN J. GENDRON
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - CG, IIFORCEV
- 2 - Asst Chief of Staff for Force Development
- 1 - Commander-In-Chief, USARPAC
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AFPM-S (1 Aug 67)

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967,
Reports Control Symbol OEFOR-45, (UIC) W128704

HEADQUARTERS, 54TH ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96376

17 August 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of
the Army, ATTN: AGSPOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 2d Bn, 35th Artillery is considered adequate.
2. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 2, Fields of Fire for Base Camps. The 54th Artillery Group concurs. The 2d Bn, 35th Artillery has civilian personnel living on three sides of its perimeter and a banana plantation on the fourth side limiting the free fire areas.
3. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 3, Rotation of Personnel. The 54th Artillery Group concurs. The 54th Artillery Group has an infusion program and personnel of the 2d Bn, 35th Artillery have been infused in the past. Plans are being made to infuse additional men from the battalion in the future.
4. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4a, Lack of Organic Aircraft. The 54th Artillery Group strongly concurs with the vital need for aircraft to conduct command and control and support units in field positions.
5. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4b, Planning of Operation. The 54th Artillery Group concurs. Task Force headquarters should make extra effort to provide timely information to units not normally associated with the headquarters since non-familiarity increased reaction time.
6. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4c, Assignment of Status and Missions. The 54th Artillery Group concurs. Receiving units should be required to provide detailed information to the attached unit on all factors of the inherent responsibilities of the gaining unit. Specifically the Who, What, When and How of support to be furnished by the gaining organization.
7. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 4d, Cross Country Mobility. The 54th Artillery Group concurs. The 2d Bn, 35th Artillery now has carrier cargo tracked 6 ton M548.
8. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 7a, AM Radio Transmitter Failures. The 54th Artillery Group requires that the radio set AN/GRC-46 be operated in the secure radio teletype mode. The continuous wave (CW) operation was used as an alternate means because the capability of radio teletype was not available to 2d Bn, 35th Artillery due to maintenance problems. Steps are being taken to bring the radio set AN/GRC-46 up to its capability of RTT operations.


AVCA-8

17 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967,
Reports Control Symbol CSFOR-65, (UIC) W22570A (Cont)

9. (C) Reference Section II, Part I paragraph 7b, 110 AC to 24 BC Converter. The 54th Artillery Group concurs. Rectifiers should be an authorized item of issue to commo sections. The situation in Vietnam requires the installation of radios in a permanent structure where 110 AC is used.

10. (C) Reference Section II, Part II. The 54th Artillery Group concurs with all recommendations of the 2d Bn, 35th Artillery.


JOHN J. MORRIS
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 67)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 31 OCT 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 2d Howitzer Battalion, 35th Artillery (WA2S) as indorsed.

2. (C) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning aviation support for artillery units, section II, part I, paragraph 4a: Concur with requirement for aircraft for artillery units; however, current DA policy is that non-divisional Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units deploying to RVN will have their aviation sections at zero strength and no aviators or aircraft will be requested for these units. Therefore, CS and CSS units must be provided aviation support from current assets on a priority basis.

b. Reference item concerning shortage of personnel, paragraph 1g, section I: Concur. There is a critical shortage within the MOS 13 Career Field due to requisition shortfall. DA has been informed of this shortage and assistance requested. This headquarters assigns personnel to the 54th Artillery Group for further assignment to units subordinate to the group. A review of records maintained at this headquarters reveals that the 54th Artillery Group is at authorized strength in MOS 36K and 94B. Action should be taken by the 54th Artillery Group to provide the 2d Battalion, 34th Artillery with personnel possessing these MOS's to reduce the shortage in that unit.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

C. S. Nakatsukasa
C. S. NAKATSUKASA
Captain, AGC
Assistant Adjutant General

28

GROUP 4

Downgraded at 3 year intervals
Declassified after 12 years
DOD DIR 5200.10 Applies

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GPOR-DT(1 Aug 67)

4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 2d How Bn, 35th Arty (UIC: WA2SAA) (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558

30 NOV 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



HEAVRIN SNYDER
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

29
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